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EVALUATING THREE LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
IN AVIATION: GLOBAL LIMITATION,  
EU DETERMINATION AND UK SELF-INTEREST* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Although the UK Coalition government has a fondness for nudge policies and proclaimed 
itself ‘the greenest government ever’, many policies are criticised or failing. In March 2011, 
the long-intended policy change from Airline Passenger Duty (APD) to Per Plane Tax (PPT) 
was dropped. Cited as ineffective at reducing aviation consumption in spite of ever-increasing 
fees, the APD is a transparent tax passed on to customers by airlines with immediacy, whereas 
the PPT would incentivise airlines to maximise capacity and therefore reduce emissions but 
would have purportedly breached the Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944 
(Chicago Convention). This article discusses central criticisms of the APD, and looks to the 
Luftverkehrsteuergesetz in Germany, the Taxe de l’aviation civile in France and prospects for 
an EU Air Tax, to conclude that whilst there is a forward movement along three levels of 
decision-making (international, European and domestic), the speed and quantum of progress 
varies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the realm of international aviation emissions and climate change, there appears to be 
progressive movement along three levels of decision-making. At macro-level is international 
law. Although the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
founded at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, is ‘universally recognized to be the appropriate 
legal forum to tackle the problem of climate change’
1
 by establishing national goals and 
reduction and limitation commitments that guide the respective national strategies vis-à-vis 
the Kyoto Protocol, international aviation emissions are, by their very nature, excluded. This 
leaves the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as the single international body 
responsible for international civil aviation, as mandated by the Chicago Convention
2
, as well 
as the sector’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
 
Whereas ICAO deals solely with international aviation emissions, UNFCCC addresses 
emissions from all other domestic sectors including domestic aviation. Additionally, ICAO 
                                                             
* Dr Steven Truxal, City University London; Rupert Dunbar, Kingston University 
1
 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and the UN Climate Change Secretariat: A Global Framework to Tackle Climate 
2
 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 9th edn, Doc. 7300/9, 2006, 
www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/7300_9ed.pdf, accessed 12 May 2011. 
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and UNFCCC each have their own independent and distinct decision-making processes. 
Despite this, there are ‘synergies’ between the two and ‘if the major portion of emissions 
from international aviation occurs in international airspace, reason seems to support that 
ICAO is the relevant and appropriate UN body to oversee the environmental aspects of 
international civil aviation’.
3
 The most recent development at ICAO was in late 2010 when 
Assembly Resolutions A37-18 and 19 brought an end to the previous ‘mutual agreement’ 
stalemate and went a step further to set out ‘aspirational’ goals for environmental protection 
and climate change. The ICAO success has been called a ‘breakthrough deal’ by the EU; 
ICAO calls it an ‘historic agreement’. This paper suggests that, at macro-level, international 
law evidences slow success. 
 
At meso-level is the European Union (EU) with its Emission Trading System (ETS)
4
. The 
ETS creates the world’s first international market cap-and-trade system of nationally 
allocated rights across the EU based on the proportion of industry in each Member State, 
which may be bought and sold. Through the ETS, the EU aims to achieve its Kyoto 
commitments while balancing which sectors and installations to include in it. This paper 
questions whether the ETS is, particularly following the decision taken to include 
international aviation emissions in it
5
, an example of ‘successful’ EU unilateralism in the 
global sphere. 
Finally, at micro-level are EU Member States – the focus of this paper is the United Kingdom 
(UK). The UK Air Passenger Duty (APD) was first introduced in 1994
6
 and rose steadily 
until March 2011 when was frozen. While it is unclear whether the APD is actually an 
environmental tax, it is certainly ‘successful’ at raising government revenue. This paper notes 
instances of similar taxes on civil aviation in other Member States such as Germany and 
France; these have been considered in this paper insofar as that they might offer a worthwhile 
comparative evaluation of the APD and proposals to change or replace it. In the main, this 
paper considers the theoretical space within which the APD exists as a ‘tax’ along a spectrum 
of Pigouvian
7
, ‘rectificatory’ and ‘nudging’ taxes
8
, to suggest that it fails to deliver on its 
purported corrective intention. One is likely to query whether the aim is to raise revenue, 
correct inefficiencies, reduce externalities, change behaviour or achieve an appropriate 
balance of some or all of these. Thus the APD potentially may be viewed as a ‘successful 
cash cow’ for filling government coffers whilst it is an ineffective fiscal instrument for its 
regulatory objectives. The APD is posited in this paper against government proposals to 
move to a Per Plane Tax (PPT). 
This paper observes the past movement and forward trajectory of decision-making relating to 
aviation emissions at three levels: international, EU and UK. The commonality is recognition 
                                                             
3
 Steven Truxal, ‘The ICAO Assembly Resolutions on International Aviation and Climate Change: An Historic 
Agreement, a Breakthrough Deal, and the Cancun Effect’ (2011) 36(3) A & SL 219. 
4
 Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32.   
5
 Directive 2008/101/EC of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community [2009] OJ L8/3. 
6
 Finance Act 1994, ss. 28—44 and schs 5A and 6, as amended. 
7
 See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4
th
 Edn, Macmillian 1932); A Study in Public Finance ( 3
rd
 Edn, 
Macmillian 1947). 
8
 See for instance A. Ogus, ´Nudging and rectifying: the use of fiscal instruments for regulatory purposes´ 
(2006) 19(2) Legal Studies 245; R. Thaler and C.R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. 
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of the need for positive change, which in this context is necessarily a synonym for abatement. 
Using this as the measure of ‘success’ and therefore the qualifying and quantifying factor in 
this analysis, the macro and meso-approaches are thereby evidence of consistent ‘success’; 
however, the micro approaches vary in achievements. The French Taxe de l’aviation civile, 
for example, ‘charges one rate for passengers flying within the EU and a higher rate for 
flights outside the EU — though the rates are significantly lower than APD rates’.
9
 Evidently 
less nuanced than the UK’s multiple ‘bands’ method and with lower rates than the UK, the 
French system is perhaps less likely to induce behavioural change and is unequivocally ‘not 
primarily designed for environmental purposes’.
10
 The Taxe has this in common with the 
German Luftverkehrsteuergesetz (LuftVStG), which the German legislature highlights as 
dual- purpose: for environmental protection and raising revenue.
11
 It has a ceiling of just 
EUR 45
12
 and consequently may struggle to change behaviour considering that the UK have 
been unsuccessful in doing so with rates of up to GBP 170 (EUR 200).
13
 Ultimately, the APD 
is a non-success whilst the proposed per plane tax (PPT) would be a relative success even if it 
skirts along the edges of existing international law. 
2. Three levels of environmental taxation 
2.1      Macro-level 
 
Article 3(1) of the Kyoto Protocol provides that participating countries will endeavour to 
address climate change by reducing emissions to five per cent below 1990 levels. Article 2(2) 
of the Protocol provides that the ICAO shall be the relevant body through which to seek 
reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in civil aviation. While this makes it clear 
that the international nature of the industries ought not to exclude them from obligations to 
reduce emissions, it also means any success shall be inextricably linked to the organisational 
structure and governance of the relevant; this is particularly problematic in the context of the 
ICAO.
14
 
The fact that ICAO is the single body responsible for international civil aviation seems to 
advocate for its position as the de facto forum for any dialogue on establishing an 
international aviation emissions framework.
15
 The ICAO already reports carbon dioxide 
(CO2) international aviation emissions data to UNFCCC, which is used to assess to the 
progress of implementation.  
 
ICAO faces a problem in Article 44 of the Chicago Convention, which mandates it, inter alia, 
to: 
                                                             
9
 JM Truby, ‘Reforming the Air Passenger Duty as an Environmental Tax’ (2010) 12(3) ELR 200, 206. 
10
 ibid. 
11
 BT-Drucks. 17/3030,1,23,26. 
12
 LuftVStG §11.  
13
 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 2008 Pre-Budget Report (24/11/2008), p 2. 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2008/pbrn20.pdf> accessed 2 February 2011. 
14
 See Steven Truxal, ‘The ICAO Assembly Resolutions on International Aviation and Climate Change: An 
Historic Agreement, a Breakthrough Deal, and the Cancun Effect’ (2011) 36(3) A & SL 217; Michel Adam, 
‘ICAO Assembly's Resolution on Climate Change: A “Historic” Agreement? (2011) 36(1) A & SL 23;  
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘The Worldwide Air Transport Conference of ICAO and its Regulatory and Economic 
Impact’ (2003) 28(4-5) A & SL 218.. 
15
 See Steven Truxal, ‘The ICAO Assembly Resolutions on International Aviation and Climate Change: An 
Historic Agreement, a Breakthrough Deal, and the Cancun Effect’ (2011) 36(3) A & SL 217, 219. 
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Insure safe and orderly growth of civil aviation…encourage the development of 
airways, airports and air navigation facilities…prevent economic waste…and promote 
generally the development of all aspects of civil international aviation. 
 
The focus is on growth and as there is no mention of ‘environment’ in the 1944 Convention.
16
 
While not surprising, it is nonetheless clear that any subsequent political traction within 
ICAO concerning environmental protection will also compete with other more entrenched 
values and schemes. Acquiring and maintaining a foothold for clear environmental protection 
policy in the sector has proved challenging – an emerging cycle of practical details defeating 
broad declarations.  
 
Whilst emissions trading schemes are generally viewed
17
 as a favourable tool for 
environmental protection as they are not overly pervasive or punishing in nature, controversy 
over the use of such market-based measures (MBMs) has been brought sharply into focus in 
the ICAO by the EU’s extension of its ETS whereby including international commercial 
aviation. In 2007, the ICAO passed Assembly Resolution A36-22 in relation to emissions 
trading in international commercial aviation, concluding that such schemes should only be 
‘on the basis of mutual agreement between those States’
18
, which amounted to a stalemate on 
international aviation emissions and climate change. The ICAO’s 37th Session of the 
Assembly ‘agreed to an historic agreement on aviation and climate change’ in 2010
19
, 
adopting two key resolutions: A37-18 and 19, which supersede Resolution A36-22. The goals 
put forward in the Resolutions are  
 
…essentially non-specific, meaning it is yet unclear whether an actual reduction will 
be achieved; [but] they are not necessarily weak in effect. For instance, specific 
elements of the resolutions include an agreement with two requirements: aircraft 
emissions must be stabilized and State Action Plans will be introduced. Of course, the 
most significant, extensive goal is for [Carbon Neutral Growth] by 2020.
20
 
 
It is noted that this is far less ambitious than the EU’s own unilateral position on including 
aviation in the ETS from 2012, which calls for a 10 per cent reduction of 2005 baseline levels 
by 2020 and reducing carbon emissions in the sector by 50 per cent by 2050. Although ICAO 
is currently working towards this more modest carbon neutral growth, it must be remembered 
that agreements done at ICAO are multilateral. 
 
                                                             
16
 See ICAO, ‘Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (‘Environmental Protection’)’, 
<http://www.icao.int/eshop/pub/anx_info/an16_info_en.pdf>, accessed 12 November 2011. 
17
 The ICAO shared the same view formerly also. See ‘Resolutions Adopted at the 33
rd
 Session of the Assembly 
(A33-7), (October 2001), http://www.icao.int/icao/en/assembl/a33/resolutions_a33.pdf, accessed 26 February 
2011. 
18
 ‘Resolutions Adopted at the 36
th
 Assembly (A36-22)’ (October 2007), 
<http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/A36_Res22_Prov.pdf>, accessed 14 May 2011.  
19
 ICAO (2010), ‘ICAO Member States Agree to Historic Agreement on Aviation and Climate Change’, (Press 
Release PIO14/10, 8 October). 
20
 Truxal, Steven. ‘The ICAO Assembly Resolutions on International Aviation and Climate Change: An Historic 
Agreement, a Breakthrough Deal, and the Cancun Effect’ (2011) A & SL 36(3) 237. 
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2.2.   Meso-level 
 
In contrast to ICAO, the EU has ‘progressed’ insofar as it is overtly required to integrate 
environmental concerns into all policies ‘with a view to promoting sustainable development’ 
by virtue of Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).
21
 
Article 191 TFEU dictates that EU environmental policy shall be based on the principle that 
‘the polluter should pay’ – the ETS as cornerstone of EU environmental policy. The 
mechanics of this particular instance are relatively straightforward, placing costs on 
companies that continue to pollute, driving innovation and rewarding the more efficient; this 
accords well with the principle. Following the extension of scope of the ETS, there surface 
international legal issues in the calculation of those emissions.
22
 
The ETS legislation appears to have an extraterritorial effect
23
 which prima facie conflicts 
with Article 1 of the Chicago Convention (which is itself a reflection of customary 
international law): ‘…that every State has complete and exclusive jurisdiction over the 
airspace above its territory’. Milde notes that overflying international waters is also the 
reserve of the ICAO
24
, so any extraterritorial element breaches Article 1 of the Convention. 
However, as only the Member States, and not the EU, are party to that Convention the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) found that rules therein were not to be binding on 
the EU.
25
 Inasmuch as any rules reflect customary international law though, the EU would be 
bound to the extent that the EU made ‘manifest errors of assessment concerning the 
conditions for applying those principles’.
26
 The CJEU then proceeded to consider any 
extraterritoriality, as Article 1 of the Chicago Convention clearly reflected customary 
international law. 
In a technical analysis, excluding the suggestion of any extraterritorial scope, the CJEU stated 
that: 
…the fact that, in the context of applying European Union environmental legislation, 
certain matters contributing to the pollution of the air, sea or land territory of the 
Member States originate in an event which occurs partly outside that territory is not 
such as to call into question, in the light of the principles of customary international 
law…the full applicability of European Union law…
27
  
 
The reasoning, and subsequent upholding, of the EU legislation in the CJEU has not ended 
the matter though. Member States’ exposure to international litigation remains and economic 
                                                             
21
 Just as in the Chicago Convention, the original European Economic Community Treaty contained no 
'environmental' provisions. 
22
 [Tonne kilometres = distance x payload] where ‘distance’ includes those parts of flights beyond the combined 
EU geographical area. 
23
 A challenge was brought against the ‘legality’ of the ETS legislation before the UK High Court, which made 
a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. See Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America, 
American, Continental and United Airlines v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (2011), 
available at <http://curia.europa.eu> accessed 5 January 2012. 
24
 Michael Milde, International Air Law and the ICAO (Eleven International Publishing 2008) 69. 
25
 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America, American, Continental and United Airlines v Secretary 
of State for Energy and Climate Change (2011) para 62. 
26
 ibid para 110. 
27
 ibid para 129. 
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reprisals against European companies by large trading partners are being considered.
28
 Yet 
the EU has been unflinching in its resolve.
29
 The CJEU judgment is notable for its promotion 
of the EU position and, by extension, the merits of environmental protection: 
...it must be pointed out that, as European Union policy on the environment seeks to 
ensure a high level of protection in accordance with Article 191(2) TFEU, the 
European Union legislature may in principle choose to permit a commercial activity, 
in this instance air transport, to be carried out in the territory of the European Union 
only on condition that operators comply with the criteria that have been established by 
the European Union and are designed to fulfill the environmental protection 
objectives which it has set for itself in particular where those objectives follow on 
from an international agreement to which the European Union is a signatory, such as 
the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. 
In spite of reference to international objectives there is clear judicial support for the EU 
legislature, in setting the environmental agenda and its pace, primarily through EU 
objectives. The task of EU environmental protection is not always a simple one though. 
For instance, it is interesting to note the lack of an EU-wide tax regime and thus the 
corresponding absence of a potential significant tool for environmental protection. The EU is 
funded through payments by Members States from gross national income, proceeds of 
agricultural levies and customs collected by Member States and a proportion of value-added 
tax (VAT) collected by Member States.
30
 Even where EU legislation deals with taxation, the 
conditions under which Member States shall collect revenue is the subject matter
31
; this 
cautious approach reflects the fact that ‘tax policy goes to the heart of national sovereignty’
32
 
and is politically sensitive.
33
 Some consideration has gone into which taxes which the EU 
could adopt, but ‘[T]he fact that the current system of own resources assures the funding of 
the EU budget indicates that if change is to be contemplated it must be for reasons other than 
pure revenue raising’.
34
 That is to say, there needs to be a political purpose or cause in order 
to drive change.  
Indeed the focus of this paper is to identify the political conflict between what may be 
perceived as revenue raising versus what may be considered ‘legitimate’ environmentally 
protective policy, pursued through ‘green’ taxation. Such a conflict that does not presently 
arise at EU level owing to the lack of an EU-wide tax regime, but other drawbacks also 
pertain. Firstly, each Member State administers the ETS for certain allocated airlines
35
 - a 
decentralization that may lead to inefficiencies. A second issue is the coherent and consistent 
use for environmental purposes of ETS-raised funds. Under the ETS, for instance, ‘it shall be 
for the Member States to determine the use to be made of revenues generated’ but that 
                                                             
28
 Pilita Clark, ‘Airbus warns of emissions trade war’, The Financial Times (London, 6 June 2011) 1. 
29
 In the context of the ICAO see ‘EU Statement of Reservation’ made to the ICAO 18-28 September 2007 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international_aviation/european_community_icao/doc/memo_eu_statement.pd
f> accessed 5 January 2011. 
30
 I Begg, ‘Funding the EU Budget: A Case for Inaction?’ (2009) 9(4) Harrisburg 506, 513. 
31
 See e.g. Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of 
energy products and electricity OJ L283/51. 
32
 M Lee, EU Environmental Law (Hart Publishing 2005) 191. 
33
 I Begg, ‘Funding the EU Budget: A Case for Inaction?’ (2009) 9(4) Harrisburg 506, 514. 
34
 ibid 516. 
35
 See Regulation (EC) 748/2009, OJ L219/1. 
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expenditure should be on ‘the cost of administering the Community scheme’
36
, and 
environmental causes potentially, but not exclusively, including those in the field of air 
transport.
37
 This lacks efficiency and clarity of focus that a centralized EU taxation capacity 
could arguably provide. Although the EU has made significant strides for environmental 
protection in the sector especially when compared to relative stagnation at the macro-level, it 
could do more. But to provide the relevant powers may require ‘legislative changes up to and 
including Treaty change’
38
 – the former a complex and time consuming negotiation and the 
latter seemingly unthinkable at present.  
 
2.3   Micro-level 
 
2.3.1  UK’s ‘greenest government ever’ 
 
In the UK, protection of the environment is seen more and more frequently as a ‘universally 
desirable policy objective’, but just as for other governments, it is not the only objective – 
policymakers must balance environmental concern with other socio-economic and political 
considerations, and these are heightened by the global recession. 
Indeed in the ‘green’ context, the fundamental challenge for any government is ‘…to devise a 
way of limiting [environmental]...damage while minimising the impact on the economically 
or socially valuable activity that gives rise to it’.
39
 In the UK, policymakers have been 
working to formulate a suitable policy response – a sustainable transition to a ‘low carbon 
economy’.  
The ‘greenest government ever’, as the current UK government has proclaimed itself, has as 
its priority to ‘support a strong and sustainable green economy; to encourage businesses, 
people and communities to manage and use natural resources in a sustainable manner … and 
work to ensure that the UK economy is resilient to climate change’.
40
 Such resilience requires 
sustainability in industry and consumption – major challenges for any government. So-called 
‘green nudge’ policies, intended to drive individual behaviour using social influence to 
change attitudes and behaviour to achieve environmental sustainability, are likely to make up 
the format of the government’s green regulation 19 of 23 green policies estimated as 
delivered by this route.
41
 Schofield observes that: 
Green policies are by definition policies designed to trigger a behavioural change … 
Getting the signal right is crucial, as if the policy is poorly designed and has to be 
changed, the consistency value of this initial signal for any future policy 
announcements can be substantially damaged.
42
 
 
                                                             
36
 This is expected to be half of total revenue. 
37
 Directive 2008/101/EC, art 3d(3). 
38
 I Begg, ‘Funding the EU Budget: A Case for Inaction?’ (2009) 9(4) Harrisburg 506, 529. 
39
 David F Williams, ‘Environmental Tax Policy’ (2008) 925 Tax Journal 18. 
40
 ‘Defra, Draft Structural Reform Plan’, (Number 10, 16 July 2010) <http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/defra-srp.pdf> accessed 20 August 2011. 
41
 Matthew Spencer, ‘Green Agenda is the glue holding the coalition together’ (The Guardian (online), 21 June 
2010) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2010/jun/21/green-agenda-coalition> accessed 8 
March 2011. 
42
 Mark Schofield, ‘Budget analysis – Environment’, (2010) 1036 (30) Tax Journal 2, 31. 
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But balancing a green policy is no easy chore. For instance, the UK Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC) recommended a host of ‘financial incentives through carbon prices, taxes and 
subsidies; support for technology innovation; information and encouragement; and regulation 
when needed’.
43
 Clearly there is little in the way of a common position so far on how best to 
proceed. 
Cleary there will always be political plans, but the essential role for government in this area is 
to set a long-term, sustainable policy framework ‘to encourage the confidence for businesses 
to invest and enable timely development of innovative products and services to speed the 
transition to a low carbon economy’.
44
 The key elements of the current UK environmental 
policy framework
45
 appear consistent with Stern’s Review
46
: 
 
 the pricing of carbon through tax, trading and regulation; 
 support for innovation and the deployment of low carbon technologies; 
 the removal of barriers to energy efficiency; and 
 improvements in information and education. 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the UK was the first country in the world to set legally binding 
‘carbon budgets’ under the Climate Change Act 2008, which has as its aim to achieve a 34 
per cent reduction of UK emissions by 2020 and a reduction of at least 80 per cent by 2050.
47
 
The CCC is charged with recommending the carbon budget levels and carbon pricing is 
supported by way of the UK’s participation in the EU ETS, and in even more precisely 
encouraged by joint initiative by British, French and German ministers to push the EU to 
move from its current commitment of a 20 per cent reduction of GHG emissions to 30 per 
cent reduction target by 2020.
48
 
 
Despite the obvious advantages to its ‘market’ alternative, calls have come in recent years 
from ‘a number of prominent economists from across the political spectrum … for Pigouvian 
taxes on gasoline as a potential means of dealing with unpriced externalities’
49
, Applying 
Pigou’s theory that actors should internalize the full social costs of their activities and be 
‘charged’ with them. The experience has been a steady rise in gasoline taxes and, in the 
aviation, the APD.  
The main problem with the Pigouvian tax is that it ‘concentrates on the presumption that the 
tax should equal the marginal externality…’.
50
 But one might ask, what ‘…is the optimal 
quantity of the good or activity that produces the externality’
51
? According to Nye, ‘There 
may also be a conflict between the desire to attain the optimal efficiency level and the desire 
                                                             
43
 The Committee on Climate Change, ‘Building a Low Carbon Economy’ (December 2008). 
44
 ibid 85. 
45
 The Chartered Institute of Taxation, ‘The Green Tax Report 2009: Green Taxes in Operation’ (2009) 
<http://www.greentaxreport.co.uk/read-chapters-online/12-green-taxes-in-operation> accessed 11 March 2011. 
46
 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (CUP 2007). 
47
 The reduction targets are founded on the 1990 baseline emission levels. 
48
 Chris Huhne, Robert Röttigen and Jean-Louis Borloo, ‘Joint EU Climate Change’ (Department of 
Environment Energy and Climate Change, 15 July 2010). 
49
 JVC Nye, ‘The Pigou Problem’ (Summer 2008) Regulation 32, 32. 
50
 ibid 36.  
51
 ibid.  
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to attenuate pollution, congestion, or carbon emissions directly.’
52
 Economic theory suggests 
working towards the optimal efficiency whereas ‘a great deal of policy seems concerned with 
reducing the size of the externality itself’.
53
 Nye gives a first-rate example of how these two 
goals are often in conflict: 
As carmakers develop less polluting automobiles or gas suppliers discover better 
refining techniques, the principle of Pigou taxation would require that the gas tax be 
lowered, yet there is no mechanism for monitoring when taxes are too high (Nye 
2008:37).
54
 
Citing a study carried out by Parry and Small
55
, Nye concludes that, ‘most calls for Pigou 
taxes are misguided attempts to condemn a particular activity as undesirable without 
consideration of the true workings of the market’.
56
 So perhaps the Pigouvian tax in its ideal 
form is not the most appropriate instrument to apply in the present context of aviation 
emissions particularly when the actual cost of that pollution cannot be determined.
57
 
Ogus identified two fiscal instruments which, ‘while falling short of the ideal Pigouvian tax, 
still attempt to induce socially desirable behavioural change’
58
: ‘rectificatory tax’ and 
‘nudging tax’. The first is different from the ideal Pigouvian in that it ‘relates to the 
imposition of the harm caused by the activity, but only to a subset of the costs thereby 
incurred’
59
 whereas in ideal Pigouvian form, ‘the tax, as an internalising device, should be 
equal to all the costs generated by the activity which are not reflected in the costs which the 
actor incurs for the activity’.
60
 Ogus differentiates the social and private costs of the activity, 
removing the problem of setting the appropriate cost in Pigouvian taxes.  Ogus’s second 
fiscal instrument is also noteworthy: the ‘nudging tax’ and its altogether different approach to 
calculation ‘by reference to what level of payment is likely to reduce the undesired 
behaviour’ rather than relating ‘the imposition of the harm caused’.
61
 
The nudging tax aims to reduce inefficiencies rather than eliminate them by achieving a 
perfect economic efficiency; but, according to Ogus: 
That does not mean that behavioural considerations are irrelevant. In devising fiscal 
regimes, policy-makers are likely to take account of behavioural effects, if only 
because they wish to maximize receipts and that will depend crucially on how 
individuals respond to impositions.
62
 
However,  ‘If…the demand for the activity or product is highly inelastic, the tax will be 
ineffective as a regulatory device…[but] a fruitful source of revenue…’.
63
 Applying this to 
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the APD, which is proving a successful at raising government revenue though having 
negligible effect on passenger numbers and therefore emissions; its environmental credentials 
are called into question. 
 
2.3.2 UK APD 
 
The UK Office for National Statistics currently reports on six key types of environmental 
taxes collected domestically: fuel duty, vehicle excise duty, air passenger duty, the climate 
change levy, landfill tax, and the aggregates levy.
64
 
Although this paper considers the UK’s APD in the main, it is interesting to note that a 
majority of duties collected are transport sector-specific. This includes the use of cars or 
roads including public transport and increasingly through the ‘use’ of air as it become more 
‘public’, which seems to be a natural association. Despite this, the airline industry continues 
to benefit from certain historical exemptions as a consequence of its international nature: 
 
At present, although road fuel is charged excise duty, which represents a substantial 
proportion of the pump price paid by motorists, aviation kerosene (AVTUR), which is 
used in jet engines, is exempt from this tax, under international agreement.
65
 
 
In this context the introduction of the UK APD in 1994 can perhaps be seen as a government 
policy aimed at limited redress of this sector’s favourable treatment. But, as with the advent 
of fuel duties, the APD was undoubtedly intended primarily to raise revenue. In recent years, 
however, the APD has been cited as having a hand in combating climate change, although 
amidst strong speculation. 
 
The APD rates were doubled in 2007, which brought with it a surge in tax revenue that was 
effectively sustained, owing apparently to the negligible effect on passenger numbers 
following introduction of the tax.
66
 Next, there came proposals to replace the APD with a 
more environmentally friendly PPT. 
 
In the Pre-Budget Report 2008, the PPT proposal was scrapped with little explanation. 
Instead, APD rates were increased and a new structure introduced comprising four 
geographical bands based on distance from London to the capital city of the destination.
67
 
The span of the APD was increased from between GBP 10-80 (EUR 11-90) during the years 
before 2008 to GBP 11-110 (EUR 13-125) in 2009. 
 
The UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee challenged the veracity of the 
APD increases and recommended the UK Treasury reinstate the plan to reform the APD into 
PPT. However, another increase to the APD was announced in Budget 2009 across a range 
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between GBP 12-170 (EUR 14-194).
68
 The anticipated effect of this rise in APD was an 
increase in annual revenue to GBP 3.8 billion (EUR 4.3 billion).
69
 George Osborne 
announced in his emergency Budget speech in June 2010 that the new government would 
‘explore changes to the aviation tax system, including switching from a per-passenger to a 
per plane duty, which could encourage fuller planes’.
70
 Though PPT has not yet been adopted 
anywhere, Germany and France also have APD-type schemes. Here it should be noted that in 
the Netherlands, an ‘ecotax’ was introduced in 2008 and abolished within 12 months when 
passengers began flying from other airports within a wide catchment area in Belgium and 
Germany where no such tax existed. A similar such scheme in Ireland was also scrapped that 
year. 
 
2.3.3 Germany and France 
The German Parliament introduced the Luftverkehrsteuergesetz
71
 in January 2011 for two 
reasons: (1) The deficit of the national budget should be reduced
72
 utilising the estimated 
income from the tax of EUR 1 billion per annum
73
; (2) The taxation focuses on mobility. 
Thus a modification is sought in the environmental behaviour of consumers.
74
 This rationale 
is not dissimilar to the stance of the current UK government, which has distanced itself from 
the purported ‘green’ origins of the tax in 1994 to now maintain that: 
We have two agendas that we’ve been perfectly frank about… One of them is using 
taxation to drive behaviour change; the other is using taxation to drive down the 
deficit. And aviation cannot be exempt from sharing and dealing with that problem 
any more than any other.
75
 
In both UK and Germany, the relative weights between the two aims of revenue-raising and 
environmental protection are called into question. In Germany, the Luftverkehrsteuergesetz 
rates are bracketed: EUR 8, EUR 25 or EUR 45.
76
 In comparison to the German and French 
equivalent rates, the UK’s EUR 200 ceiling is particularly high. Despite this, the APD has 
‘largely failed as an instrument to change behaviour and instead is generally seen only as a 
revenue-raising measure’.
77
 This implies that the two aims, even if superficially logical, are 
not necessarily mutually reinforcing. It also follows that the UK policy may be more 
controversial than the French and German systems, appearing  more opportunistic or blatant 
in its pursuit to raise revenue. 
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The German tax covers commercial flights but private and cargo flights are excluded
78
; the 
UK has now closed included private flights. The stated rationale for Germany’s exclusion of 
cargo flights is the existence of good levels of international competition and ‘sensibility’ of 
the market.
79
 The UK also focuses only on passengers whereas the French Taxe imposes a 
(lesser) charge on cargo.
80
 Whilst the UK government ultimately felt that international law 
precluded switching to PPT, a more nuanced APD following the French model and 
incorporating cargo, would have operated within the confines of international law, 
‘reluctantly’ accepted as the obstacle.
81
 This would prioritize environmental protection and 
social justice. 
The lowest Luftverkehrsteuergesetz rate applies to all flights with target countries less than 
2,500 kilometres away from Frankfurt/Main airport. Consequently some flights, such as those 
to British or France Overseas Territories, have distances greater than 15,000 kilometres and 
will only be charged at the EUR 8 rate.
82
 The likelihood of changing consumer behaviour in 
these instances inevitably declines because of the missing link between actual pollution and 
the tax rate.
83
 To deal with this, the UK government consulted ‘…on how to improve the 
existing and rather arbitrary bands that appear to believe that the Caribbean is further away 
than California’.
84
 
Examination of the divergent approaches to German, French and UK– including or excluding 
cargo, charging significantly different rates based on varied calculations – reveals that no 
single method exists for balancing satisfactorily the relevant competing interests in this area. 
Truby concludes overall that the UK APD remains a ‘blunt, misconceived and arbitrary 
economic instrument’ for which abolition is ‘long overdue’.
85
 
 
2.3.4 UK PPT proposals 
 
A successful policymaker would distinguish more clearly between ‘improving the tax 
environmentally (by aligning the tax with emissions rather than passenger numbers, 
something the EU ETS is supposed to address, when it applies to the airline sector) from 
attempts to raise more revenues from the sector’.
86
 A change to PPT would also accord with 
the polluter pays principle. Airline companies currently pass APD rates on to consumers with 
immediacy, which has not modified consumer behaviour and as very succinctly stated by one 
commentator, ‘environmental taxes change behaviour’.
87
 The APD is then flawed by this 
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standard – but even if it were modifying consumer behaviour it also does not recognize that 
airlines are part of the problem. Presumably, airlines operating below capacity would be more 
damaged financially under the PPT. The PPT would drive efficiency and encourage 
innovation. At current the consumer has only two choices in terms of limiting emissions: take 
the flight or not. And under PPT the airlines would be incentivized to engage with multiple 
factors, such engagement would be better for competition. In this context it is notable that a 
trait of oligopolies
88
 is often transparency and similarity of cost structures.
89
 
 
In the 2011 Budget, George Osborne stated: 
We hoped we could replace the per passenger tax with a per plane tax. We have tried 
every possible option, but have reluctantly had to accept that all are currently illegal 
under international law. So we will work with others to try to get that law [the 
Chicago Convention] changed.
 90
 
This statement raises some interesting questions. For example, the analysis above reveals the 
immediacy with which it could be seen that such a policy could prima facie conflict with the 
Chicago Convention. Arguably one would have anticipated, however, the APD to have 
already breached it. This perception was addressed (at least insofar as UK courts are 
concerned) in the Tour Operators case
91
 in which the Court interpreted Article 15 of the 
Convention rather restrictively. 
Mr Justice Burnton took the language of ICAO’s Policies on Taxation
92
, stating that ‘each 
Contracting State shall reduce…and make plans to eliminate…all forms of taxation on the 
sale or use of international transport by air, including taxes on…operators and taxes levied 
directly on passengers or shippers’
93
, to mean that Article 15 could not have required 
abolition of the APD. This reflects the current state of UK law
94
 and therefore it is difficult to 
comprehend why such reasoning could not be applied equally to the PPT. Hypothetically, the 
PPT would be placed on a firm legal basis, contrary to recent government assertions. 
It is thus questioned what exactly has changed and whether international problems previously 
perceived by government as less relevant now provide a convenient excuse. The UK 
approach is recalled as markedly inconsistent with the rather bold stance of the EU; this 
might be taken as undermining EU confidence in ETS-legality. The rather obvious reality is 
that UK government is not optimistic about Chicago Convention amendments. Indeed, the 
APD scheme now includes private jets, is frozen until 2012 and rates on long-haul routes to 
Northern Ireland have been halved.  
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3    Conclusion  
 
The transport sector has traditionally been the breadwinner of environmental taxes in the UK, 
so when it comes to air transport, the advent and implementation of the APD was expected. 
In any case, UK policymakers are clearly in a difficult predicament when it comes to 
transport, which is as essential to development as it is to detrimental to sustainability, as they 
perform this particular balancing act. Over the past four years, however, the APD duties on 
some flights have increased more than three-fold. It comes as no surprise then that the APD 
has been heavily criticised by consumers on the grounds that as a ‘tax on tourism’, it restricts 
on the one hand opportunities for the less-advantaged to travel by air, and on the other hand 
incoming tourism to the UK.  
 
At a time when it appears numbers of passengers travelling to Europe are on the increase, a 
decrease in UK traffic would be bad news for the APD. In November 2011, CEOs of the four 
major airlines in the UK met with George Osborne on a joint campaign to scrap the APD – a 
response is awaited. The previous response was a reminder that the APD is a tax on airlines; 
they pass it on to passengers as a business charge.
95
 
 
As the air transport sector is naturally global, it seems only appropriate that the UK should 
not need to ‘go it alone’. Rather than at various stages be subject to different interpretations 
by states, the subject should ideally be dealt with on the macro-level under the Chicago 
Convention, or if that is not possible then on the (meso) EU-level. Whilst it is not foreseeable 
that the Treaty will be amended anytime soon, there has been limited talk of a new direct 
taxation scheme on air transport with a view to co-finance the EU budget. But it is interesting 
to note that duties on air traffic may serve purposes other than supporting ‘the green agenda’, 
namely serving as a direct finance resource; taxation can lead to temptation. Thus although 
EU determination does not currently resemble self-interest, nor appear likely to capitulate 
under increasing global pressures, one should also remember that the UK’s ‘greenest 
government ever’ seems to have fallen foul of both. Perhaps then EU direct taxation in 
aviation is undesirable overall. It currently appears that quasi-taxation ‘schemes’ are 
preferable to direct ‘duties’. That multiple interests can prevent schemes coming to fruition, 
whilst self-interest can undermine the environmental credentials of any scheme already in 
existence. The EU sits uniquely between such extremes, with political commonalities and 
very limited interest in the revenue its ETS raises it has been provided with the opportunity to 
focus on making the greatest environmental progress. But crucially, it has taken it. 
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